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ABSTRACT 
 
This research report aims to assess the meaning of dignity in philosophy and the law and 
apply this interpretation to allow for the permission of euthanasia in South Africa. Appeals to 
dignity used by both those in favour of and opposed to euthanasia are deliberated. Theories of 
dignity and its applications in South African Law are outlined followed by a classification of 
dignity as either intrinsic or extrinsic. Interpretations of this overview forms the basis of my 
argument that human beings have extrinsic dignity, derived from an inherent, intrinsic dignity 
that can be extended to include the right to die with dignity. I conclude by claiming that at the 
end-of-life, a terminally ill, cognitively unimpaired person should be allowed to choose death 
by euthanasia. I support this claim by arguing that the loss of extrinsic dignity in such 
situations can reasonably outweigh the value of one’s own intrinsic dignity.  
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CHAPTER 1: DIGNITY AND EUTHANASIA IN SOUTH 
AFRICA – RATIONALE FOR A NORMATIVE AND LEGAL 
ANALYSIS  
1.1. Introduction 
1.1.1 Research question  
The aim of my research is to carry out a normative assessment of the meaning of 
dignity and apply this interpretation to support euthanasia in South Africa. In seeking 
to fulfil this aim, I address the following research question: What is dignity and how 
does it impact on morality and the law concerning euthanasia in South Africa?  
 
I argue that: human beings have an inherent dignity that can be extended to include 
the moral and legal right to die with dignity. 
 
1.1.2 Rationale for study 
Euthanasia is defined as a “doctor intentionally killing a person by the administration 
of drugs, at the person’s voluntary and competent request” (Materstvedt et al., 2003: 
98). Physician-assisted suicide is defined as a “doctor intentionally helping a person 
to commit suicide by providing drugs for self-administration, at that person’s 
voluntary and competent request” (Materstvedt et al., 2003: 98). In 1998 the South 
African Law Commission drafted a proposed End of Life Decisions Act, named the 
Euthanasia and the artificial preservation of life: Discussion Paper (South African 
Law Commission, 1997). The Commission agreed at the time that there is no “general 
intrinsic moral difference” between euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. The 
bill was tabled in Parliament in 2000 but euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide 
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remain illegal and is commonly regarded as unethical in South Africa (Health 
Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) Guidelines for the Withholding and 
Withdrawing of Treatment, Booklet 12, 2008). For purposes of this research report, 
the term euthanasia is used to include voluntary acts of active euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide. The act of passive euthanasia i.e. the cessation of medical 
treatment is not under consideration. 
 
Section 10 of the Constitution of South Africa states that “everyone has inherent 
dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected” (Constitution, 
1996). The right to dignity has been used as a basis to legalise euthanasia in countries 
like the Netherlands (Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review 
Procedures) Act, 2002) and Belgium (The Belgian Act on Euthanasia, 2002). In spite 
of an enshrined right to dignity in South Africa, the right to die with dignity in the 
form of euthanasia is not permitted. 
 
1.1.3 Background literature analysis 
The term dignity is typically used according to the Oxford dictionary definition: “the 
state or quality of being worthy of honour or respect” (Oxford University Press, 
2015a). Immanuel Kant suggests that human beings have intrinsic worth or dignity 
because they are able to guide their actions and behaviour autonomously, through 
rational thought (Rachels & Rachels, 2012). Kant’s theory remains perhaps the most 
influential Western conception of dignity (Metz, 2012). 
 
This contrasts with African conceptions of dignity that are rooted in goods like 
vitality and community ( Iroegbu, 2005 cited in Metz 2012:24). According to Metz it 
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is our ubuntu, our communal nature that makes us the most important beings. Our 
dignity is constituted by our ability to use our intelligence to show concern for others 
and to form relationships with other human beings (Metz, 2011; Metz, 2012). 
According to Russel Botman (2000): “The dignity of human beings emanates from 
the network of relationships, from being in community; in an African view, it cannot 
be reduced to a unique, competitive and free personal ego” (cited in Metz, 2011: 543). 
Vitality, or life force, is traditionally interpreted as a valuable, spiritual or invisible 
energy that exists in physical or visible things and manifests as (but is not limited to) 
health, strength, growth, reproduction, creativity, vibrancy, activity, self-motion, 
courage and confidence. This vitalist conception of dignity holds that human beings 
are considered supreme because we possess the most life force. The presence of 
disease and weakness represents a lack of vitality (Iroegbu, 2005 cited in Metz 
2012:24; Mkhize, 2008 cited in Metz 2012:24). A lack of vitality as described here, is 
comparable with the definition of a terminal illness offered below by the South 
African Law Commission (1997). 
 
The proposed End of Life Decisions Act has defined a terminal illness as an illness; 
injury or other physical or mental condition that: 
a) in reasonable medical judgement, will inevitably cause the untimely death 
of the patient concerned and which is causing the patient extreme 
suffering; or 
b) causes a persistent and irreversible vegetative condition with the result that 
no meaningful existence is possible for the patient. (South African Law 
Commission, 1997: xv) 
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These are the same circumstances under which euthanasia can be applied for under 
the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act in the Netherlands. An 
Act that according to the Dutch Due Care Criteria, endorses the right to dignity 
(Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). This Act provides the terminally ill, 
those who are experiencing “unbearable suffering with no prospect of improvement”, 
with the choice of a dignified death. Dignity, whether it is grounded in the Kantian 
ideal of autonomy or vitality and community prized by African ethicists, remains 
integral to our humanness.  
 
I show in my argument in Chapter Three that dignity may be lost when terminally ill 
individuals are deprived of the decision of when to die. In the Kantian sense, this 
involves autonomously choosing when to die. Dignity in dying may be restored when 
one’s last chosen moment involves interacting with loved ones in a lucid, coherent 
state that speaks to African conceptions of dignity derived from vitality and 
community.  
 
1.2. Study Objectives  
I consider the question: what is dignity and how does it impact on morality and law 
concerning euthanasia in South Africa? The main objectives of my study are 
therefore: 
To examine whether these conceptions of dignity support a moral right to die with 
dignity. 
To examine whether these conceptions of dignity support a legal right to die with 
dignity. 
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1.3. Methodology 
This is a normative study using desktop and library based research. No new data has 
been collected or analysed. I employ the typical research methods and standards 
applicable to philosophical research including the interpretation and critical analysis 
of salient texts and the positing and defence of new arguments. My critical analysis of 
relevant texts include the definition and clarification of concepts, the identification 
and criticism of assumptions, the analysis and evaluation of theoretical frameworks, 
the development and defence of arguments, the use of counter-examples, and the 
articulation of the most plausible interpretation of significant concepts found in the 
sources.  
 
Sources of literature include and are not limited to articles at the Wits University 
Library, Online Library Sources, Pubmed, Jstor, Wiley Science, and Google Scholar. 
 
1.4. Argumentative strategy 
1.4.1 Theories of dignity 
I present arguments using conceptions of dignity to support the right to die with 
dignity. Further to the Kantian and African conceptions of dignity I examine other 
conceptions of dignity grounded in philosophy and theology that include Aristotle’s 
notion of human flourishing, eudemonia and Hobbes’ theory of human dignity based 
on one’s social suitability (Aristotle, 1985; Hobbes, 1999). Various bioethical 
opinions by the likes of Beauchamp and Childress (2001), who suggest that depriving 
an autonomous individual who is terminally ill of the option of euthanasia will result 
in a loss of dignity and despair, are contained in this report. 
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1.4.2 Dignity in South African Law 
My starting point is that at an international level the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948) already had intrinsic dignity entrenched as a 
notion in 1948. I then consider our South African Constitutional Court judgments that 
have highlighted the importance of human dignity on numerous occasions. In the  
2002 judgement of Khumalo and Others v Holomisa, Judge O’Regan refers to the 
constitutional value of human dignity as:  
not only being concerned with an individual’s sense of self-worth, but 
constitutes an affirmation of the worth of human beings in our society. It 
includes the intrinsic worth of human beings shared by all people as well as 
the individual reputation of each person built upon his or her own individual 
achievements. (Khumalo and Others v Holomisa, 2002 para. 27) 
 
This is followed by an overview of the concept of dignity and its application to 
relevant South African case law. At the time of Stransham-Ford’s successful 
application in 2015 to be assisted with his suicide, Judge Fabricius considered the 
judgment using Ackermann’s conception of human dignity as being not only a value 
and a right, but also a categorical imperative (Ackermann, 2012; Stransham-Ford v 
Minister of Justice And Correctional Services and Others, 2015).   
 
1.4.3 Objections 
Opponents of euthanasia include religious factions, disability groups, the World 
Medical Association, the South African Medical Association, the Health Professions 
Council of South Africa (HPCSA) and Hospice Palliative Care Association of South 
Africa. Arguments using dignity are used by both those in favour of and opposed to 
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euthanasia. When the Belgian Act on Euthanasia was passed Catholic bishops in 
Belgium declared that assisted suicide is “opposed to the fundamental respect for 
human life that lies at the heart of a society based on human dignity” (Ames, 2002). 
Hospice Palliative Care Association of South Africa (2014) describes palliative care 
as an approach that improves the quality of life of the terminally ill. Their mission 
statement is “to promote quality in life, dignity in death and support in bereavement 
for all living with a life-threatening illness...”. I consider these and other applications 
of dignity used to argue against euthanasia in my report. I argue that these definitions 
of dignity are not suitable for this debate. Finally, I include a section on the opinions 
of various bioethicists who argue that dignity has no place in bioethics at all 
(Cochrane, 2010; Macklin, 2003) and show that it has absolute value within the 
discourse. 
 
1.5. Outline  
This project aims to define dignity in an attempt to argue for the right to euthanasia in 
South Africa based on the right to dignity. Chapter Two involves reviewing: 
definitions of dignity in history and philosophy; relevant references to dignity in 
South African law; and a classification of dignity. In Chapter Three I examine how 
dignity has been used to argue against euthanasia. Here I counter these arguments 
with my analysis of dignity and have shown how it can be used to support euthanasia. 
In Chapter Four I conclude my argument with reference to the aforementioned 
sections. 
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1.6. Ethics 
The research did not involve study participants so there were no related ethical issues 
that required consideration. Consequently I was granted an ethics waiver from the 
Human Research Ethics Committee (Medical), which is attached as Appendix A. 
 
1.7. Limitations 
Arguments against euthanasia that speak to the sanctity of life and the wrongness of 
taking a life as well as slippery slope arguments that refer to vulnerability and 
coercion is not deliberated in this report. My conclusion is therefore not an all things 
considered argument that permitting euthanasia is ethically and legally mandated, 
since there may be competing values and rights that must also be taken into account.  
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CHAPTER 2: DIGNITY - AN OVERVIEW OF CONCEPTS, 
CATEGORIES AND THE LAW 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Dignity recognises the inherent worth of all individuals (including children) as 
members of our society, as well as the value of the choices that they make. It 
comprises the deeply personal understanding we have of ourselves, our worth 
as individuals and our worth in our material and social context. (Teddy Bear 
Clinic for Abused Children and Another v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development and Another, 2013, para. 52)  
 
Dignity, expressed above by Justice Khampepe in a recent Constitutional Court 
judgment, remains a cornerstone of the South African Constitution (1996). It is 
difficult to define, has been labelled useless, and has been put forth as simply the 
secularised form of human sanctity (Gelernter, 2009 cited in Palk, 2015: 45; Macklin, 
2003). Despite such criticisms, dignity continues to be used universally as an effective 
argument against practices that are harmful and degrading. These arguments are 
generally based on an underlying premise that dignity is regarded as a universal social 
good (Schachter, 1983 cited in Palk, 2015: 45).  
 
Both palliative care and the practice of euthanasia are presented as modalities that 
relieve suffering and maintain the inherent dignity of the person in end-of-life care. 
The definition of dignity however in the context of euthanasia and assisted suicide is 
as ambiguous, if not more, than its use in other bioethical issues. 
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Human dignity, as an inherent, inviolable quality possessed by all persons, gained 
international prominence following the atrocities of World War II, which included a 
Nazi euthanasia programme that targeted mentally and physically disabled patients 
living in institutional settings in Germany (Holocaust Encyclopedia, 2015). Human 
dignity as an essential moral and legal value can be found in the constitutions of 157 
countries (Barilan, 2012 cited in Michael, 2014: p. 15). Section 10 of the Constitution 
of South Africa states: “everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their 
dignity respected and protected”. In spite of an enshrined right to dignity in South 
Africa, the right to die with dignity in the form of euthanasia is not permitted.  
 
The right to dignity has however been used as a basis to legalise euthanasia in 
countries like the Netherlands (Dutch Termination of Life on Request and Assisted 
Suicide (Review Procedures) Act. 2002) and Belgium (The Belgian Act on 
Euthanasia, 2002). In April 2002, the Dutch Termination of Life on Request and 
Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act came into force, which legalised euthanasia 
under certain conditions in the Netherlands. According to the regulating body, the 
main reasons patients request euthanasia include pain, degradation, and the desire to 
die with dignity (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010).  
 
The South African Law Commission drafted a proposed End of Life Decisions Act in 
1997 in which several references are made to dignity. In the report the Commission 
agreed that there is no “general intrinsic moral difference” between euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide (South African Law Commission, 1997). The bill was 
tabled in Parliament in 2000 but euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide remains 
illegal and is commonly regarded as unethical in South Africa (Health Professions 
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Council of South Africa (HPCSA) Guidelines For The Withholding And 
Withdrawing Of Treatment, Booklet 12, 2008).  
 
Arguments appealing to dignity are used by both those in favour of and opposed to 
euthanasia. The HPCSA (2008) explicitly prohibits the practice of euthanasia and 
assisted suicide. The Guidelines for the Withholding and Withdrawing of Treatment 
is said to provide an ethical framework for physicians making decisions around the 
withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment in end-of-life care. A 
framework, which they believe, recognises the desire patients have to die with 
dignity. It is however clear that the notion of dignity is interpreted differently when 
used by those on opposite sides of the euthanasia debate. In Willem Landman’s 
position paper (2012) for the Ethics Institute of South Africa, End-of-life decisions, 
ethics and the law: A case for statutory legal clarity and reform in South Africa, he 
expresses that at the end-of-life, when incurable illness causes endless suffering and 
makes for a life that is no longer good, the medical profession has an obligation to 
respect an autonomous request to die with dignity. According to the Dutch Due Care 
Criteria, the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act in the 
Netherlands is an Act that endorses the right to dignity (Netherlands Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2010). The Act stresses that although euthanasia is not part of 
medical care, doctors are obliged to relieve the suffering of their patients once other 
treatment becomes futile so that their patients can die with dignity.  
 
The opinions referenced above indicate that the concept of dignity in the context of 
euthanasia requires clarification. The following sections of this chapter present 
existing conceptions of dignity in history and philosophy; dignity in South African 
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Law; and a classification of the types of dignity. Chapter Three will examine the uses 
of dignity in debates surrounding euthanasia and apply notions from Chapter Two to 
argue for its permissibility. In section 2.4 I will outline a classification of dignity that 
describes the concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic dignity. In Chapter Three I will 
explain how these classes of dignity can be weighted and balanced when a terminally 
ill person makes the choice to die by euthanasia on the basis of dignity.  
 
The definition of person for the purposes of this report is the Akan one elaborated on 
by John Locke: “a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can 
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places” (Locke, 
1690 cited in Singer, 1993: 162). In the Akan sense, a West African culture dating 
back to 12th century, there is a distinction between a human being and a person. A 
human being is merely a biological entity that simply exists, while a person is a being 
bestowed with unique moral and metaphysical qualities. Personhood may well 
originate from one’s human status, but is only achieved through the exercising of 
capacities (Wingo, 2008). Persons are accorded full moral status generating special 
treatment that presupposes: not being interfered with, a reason to be assisted, and an 
intention to be treated fairly. This special treatment rendered by full moral status 
appears to resonate with the notion of dignity. For some full moral status is grounded 
in cognitive capacities, particularly autonomy, while for others it is grounded in 
sentience, and the capacity to experience pleasure or pain (Jaworska & Tannenbaum, 
2013). 
 
Since only voluntary acts of euthanasia and assisted suicide are being considered here, 
notions of dignity will be restricted to adult cognitively unimpaired persons who are 
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able to make informed and considered decisions concerning the way they want to die. 
The basis of appeals to dignity in this regard will be explored in this report. The 
dignity of other beings is not being discussed or considered here.  
 
2.2. Theories of Dignity in History, Philosophy, and Ethics 
This section reviews references to dignity in history, philosophy, and ethics. 
Philosophical accounts of dignity can be traced back to the ancient world. Around 
850BC, Homer was believed to have referred to a dignified person as an unusually 
excellent person (Foster, 2011). The etymology of dignity can be traced back to Greek 
and Roman antiquity in the form of the Latin terms dignus and dignitas where it was 
used to signify “worthiness for honour and esteem” (Schulman, 2008: 6). Dignitas 
was used in ancient society to refer to someone of high social standing, in particular 
noblemen and men in high offices, who were said to possess Aristocratic dignity. 
(Foster, 2011: 45).  
 
Today, the term dignity is not only reserved for those who occupy positions of power, 
but is broadly considered to be an inviolable property of all human beings. Since 
antiquity, philosophers and scholars have put forth various conceptions of dignity. 
These conceptions are tied to several qualities displayed by human beings, either 
developed, or innate. For many, dignity is tied to a person’s ability to reason, for 
others it is a function of the nature of man and/or their freedom, and for some, its is 
connected to man’s various capacities. For these reasons, I have presented an 
overview of conceptions of dignity using a thematic approach while acknowledging 
that for some philosophers the themes may overlap.  
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2.2.1 Dignity in Nature 
In De dignitate et excellenia hominis (On the Dignity and Excellence of Man), Italian 
humanist scholar Giannozzo Manetti advances arguments for dignity that is tied to 
both nature and God. Manetti held that God created the world for the sake of human 
beings who, superior to the rest of creation, were created in his own likeness. He 
believed that human beings are born possessing dignity and have it in equal amount. 
According to Manetti, human beings possess a biblical similarity to God and they 
have dignity because they were endowed with senses and intellect to pursue active 
lives (Lewis, 2007). 
 
Philosophers like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and David Hume later echoed the 
idea that dignity is derived from human nature. According to Hobbes (1660), human 
dignity is tied to both the state and nature of society: “The publique worth of a man, 
which is the value set on him by the Commonwealth, is that which men call dignity” 
(cited in Van der Graaf & Van Delden, 2009: 157). For Hobbes, dignity is not 
intrinsic to human beings but is merely the value placed on man by the state, 
regardless of one’s nature or excellence as a human being (Schulman, 2008). 
According to Hobbes, an absolute state is required to protect human dignity since he 
also saw man as naturally cruel and aggressive (Sulmasy, 2008). 
 
Locke believed that human dignity is a status that exists prior to any social structure 
but that a contract is required between human beings to enable a social structure that 
can protect human dignity and rights (Hailer & Ritschl, 1996). For Locke, natural 
rights, including that of human dignity, flowed from natural law that originated from 
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God. He further argued that these laws of nature dictate that the God given rights of 
life, health, liberty, or possessions must therefore be protected (Fieser, 2015). 
 
In On the dignity and meanness of Human Nature, David Hume writes that the dignity 
of human nature has always divided philosophers and poets and expresses that dignity 
is not conditional, it cannot be created or developed, and it is a naturally occurring 
feature that cannot be lost (Van der Graaf & Van Delden, 2009). Hume offers a 
secularised notion of dignity and advocates for a conception and affirmation thereof 
that is independent of theology (Lebech, 2011). The aforementioned theorists regard 
dignity as a metaphysical property that is natural to human beings. In other words, all 
human beings, regardless of their cognitive abilities, possess dignity. In my view, this 
notion of dignity is therefore not relevant in pro-euthanasia arguments that refer to the 
dignity of adult cognitively unimpaired persons who voluntarily choose euthanasia. 
This theory can be differentiated from the conception of dignity in the following 
section where dignity is presented as a notion that exists in virtue of the many and 
varied capacities of man. 
 
2.2.2 Dignity bound to Capacities 
Dignity has been linked to the possession and/or exercise of various capacities. 
Capacities in this group include the capacities for reason, freedom, virtue, thriving, 
higher pleasure, vitality, spirituality, community, and capabilities.  
 
Reason  
Most philosophical accounts of dignity are identified with reason. According to the 
Stoics, whose philosophies date back to the 3rd century BC, all human beings possess 
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dignity because of their intrinsic rationality (Foster, 2011). It was Cicero who first 
provided a clear and important example of this conception of dignity. He used the 
Roman term dignitas to express this idea and universalised the term to apply to all 
human beings. For him, human beings are superior in virtue of their nature (Sensen, 
2011). He cautioned restraint where the potential outcome of an action impacted on 
one’s sophisticated appearance and dignity. In On Duties, he expressed that human 
beings are elevated over animals because they are capable of reason and that they are 
duty bound to consider the excellence and dignity of their nature (Cicero, 44 BC cited 
in Van der Graaf & Van Delden, 2009: 154). According to Cicero, nature has given 
one reason and one’s actions must therefore be reasoned (Sensen, 2011). In summary, 
Cicero believed that the superiority that human beings naturally have over animals 
generates a duty to behave in a way worthy of this ascribed dignity. 
 
Immanuel Kant however, evidently influenced by Cicero, remains perhaps the most 
famous modern philosopher to talk about human dignity (Sensen, 2011). The most 
influential Western conception of dignity is derived from his deontology (Metz, 
2012). Kant’s conception of dignity has informed the notion of intrinsic dignity 
entrenched in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights: 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a 
spirit of brotherhood. (UN General Assembly, 1948) 
 For Kant, dignity is only possessed by beings with the capacities for personhood. The 
capacities for personhood are moral agency and autonomy (Cochrane, 2010; Wingo, 
2008). He held that persons have intrinsic worth because they are able to guide their 
actions and behaviour through reason (Rachels & Rachels, 2012).  
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It was Kant (1785) who reasoned that dignity is grounded in morality and autonomy 
when he expressed: “autonomy is thus the ground of the dignity of a human and of 
every rational nature” (cited in Michael, 2014: 14). Herein lies the sentiment at the 
core of the pro-euthanasia argument supporting the right to die with dignity. Ethicists 
like Deryck Beyleveld, Roger Brownsword, and Ronald Dworkin have expanded on 
Kant’s ideas. Dignity, for Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, resonates with 
Kant’s ideas in that it lies in the freedom to follow one’s autonomously chosen goals. 
On their view however, dignity includes respecting the capacity for autonomy of 
those who lack it and may never possess it (Ashcroft, 2005). They distinguish 
between two senses of dignity: dignity in the freedom to follow one’s autonomously 
chosen goals, and dignity as the foundation for legal arguments against practices that 
are contrary to dignity.  
 
For Saints Augustine and Leo the Great in the Christian Middle Ages, human beings 
had dignity because they were created in the image of God, the Imago Dei. St 
Augustine claimed that God created humans in his own image as rational beings 
possessing free will (Lawler, 2008). This sentiment is echoed by Leo the Great, who 
was one of the first Christian thinkers to make reference to dignity: “Wake up then, o 
friend, and acknowledge the dignity of your nature. Recall that you have been made 
according to the image of God” (Leo, 451 cited in Sensen, 2011: 78). Both saints refer 
to a conception of dignity that is derived from what they believed is the God-given 
capacity to reason. A capacity that other beings lack. In Leo’s view human beings are 
distinct from other creatures and must therefore make use of these capacities and 
realise their dignity. This view is similar to both Cicero’s and Kant’s duty driven 
theories but here reason is derived from the divine (Sensen, 2011). 
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Freedom 
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, the Italian humanist, also made the link between 
dignity and freedom. At the end of the Renaissance he published an oration, renamed 
On the Dignity of Man following his death. Although dignity is not mentioned in the 
text, Pico’s contemporaries regarded the whole text as a dissertation on dignity. 
Central to his thesis is the idea that all creatures are controlled by God except humans 
who have been created with the ability to freely determine their own nature (Pico 
della Mirandola, 1486 cited in Van der Graaf & Van Delden, 2009: 156). For him, 
even though people are free to choose what dignity means to them, their duty is to 
make the most of it. Like Pico, Kant also made reference to free will in his works 
(Sensen, 2011). According to Kant persons have dignity because their free will is 
combined with rationality (Rachels & Rachels, 1986).  
 
Van der Graaf and Van Delden have defined Pico’s form of dignity as subjective 
dignity. They caution however that its religiosity makes it unsuitable for medical 
ethics. In spite of this, the notion of choosing one’s own conception of dignity was 
theorised over half a century ago. This appeals to the pro-euthanasia argument and 
will be expanded on in section four of this Chapter, a classification of dignity, and in 
the discussion covered in Chapter Three.  
 
Virtue 
Although Aristotle made no mention of dignity, aksioprepeia, in his works, the 
following quotation has been attributed to him: “Dignity does not consist in 
possessing honors, but in deserving them” (Aristotle, n.d.). Respect and esteem are 
just two of the synonyms for honour found in the Oxford dictionary (Oxford 
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University Press, 2015). Here the implication is that dignity is associated with 
praiseworthy actions and not simply possessed due to one’s status. According to 
Aristotle, a virtue is a trait of character developed out of habitual action (Rachels & 
Rachels, 2012). Dignity can therefore be linked to Aristotle’s virtues since being 
honourable, or praiseworthy could be considered one of the virtues (Schroeder, 2008). 
 
According to Jyl Gentzler (2003), many of the capabilities that Aristotle identifies as 
the human virtues of thought and character are important to human dignity. For 
Aristotle, the human virtues are those cognitive and emotional capabilities whose 
exercise allows a person to live a good, distinctively human life. Human beings’ 
capabilities for effective information gathering, problem solving, value judgment, 
social interaction, loving intimacy, and control of fear and desire are instrumentally 
valuable for the satisfaction of their most basic human needs. This conception can 
however be linked to Kant’s capacity for reason since the virtues, one could argue, are 
exercised by autonomous choice. According to Aristotle however, the mere potential 
for such cognitive and emotional capabilities is what separates us from non-human 
animals and is integral to the good life, or eudaimonia (Gentzler, 2003) Gentzler 
(2003) suggests that a life with dignity is a life where one engages in activities that 
either develop or exercise the human virtues. Aristotle’s eudaimonia, outlined below, 
has also been associated with dignity by ethicists like Charles Foster (2011), Jyl 
Gentzler (2003) and Leon Kass (2008). 
 
Thriving 
Dignity has been linked to the concept of eudaimonia, Aristotle’s notion of the good 
life or human thriving, based on his assumption that most people wish to lead good 
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lives (Shields, 2015). The principal idea is that human beings try to live well so that 
they can achieve eudaimonia, which for Aristotle is the highest good. For him this is 
carried out when the nature of human beings is fully realised, through rational 
virtuous activity. In his view, eudaimonia has three characteristics: “It is desirable for 
itself, it is not desirable for the sake of some other good, and all other goods are 
desirable for its sake” (Kraut, 2014). In other words, other goals such as health, 
strength, and wealth are secondary to achieving eudaimonia, life’s highest end. Here 
one’s dignity appears to be tied to realising this end.. 
 
In Human Dignity in Bioethics and Law, Charles Foster (2011) defines dignity as 
objective human thriving. He draws from the Aristotelian tradition by highlighting 
that human dignity is tied to laws and conduct that allow persons to thrive, to flourish, 
as moral beings living together in a shared moral, social, and legal system. According 
to Foster, dignity is the bioethical theory of everything, the normative basis for 
morally defensible law, the fundamental principle in which the Biomedical principles 
are rooted. For Foster, dignity is analysed via an audit of the transaction that occurs in 
a given situation. He refers to this as a transactional approach. He suggests that one 
should review the net amount of dignity left after a transaction has occurred. 
According to Foster, there can be many stakeholders involved in a transaction and the 
dignity of each stakeholder must be considered in the audit since the dignity interests 
of all the stakeholders in a proposed action or inaction may be affected. In bioethics, 
stakeholders include the patient, the clinicians, the families, society more generally, 
the unborn and the dead. He suggests weighting the dignity scores of all the 
stakeholders in what he refers to as a sort of utilitarian calculus to decide how much 
dignity is in issue in the transaction. For Foster (2013), a negative score would 
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prohibit the transaction. The transaction with the higher score becomes the preferred 
transaction. 
 
According to Leon Kass (2008), a bioethicist who has written extensively on the topic 
of dignity, dignity is tied to both flourishing and vitality. For him, the presence of 
vitality is necessary for dignity but it is only fully realised through pursuit of the good 
life. He refers to the flourishing of human possibility as the higher (full) dignity of 
being human and active human vitality as the lower (basic) dignity of human being. 
He emphasises that the two types of dignity are mutually interdependent because the 
humanly high, flourishing, cannot exist without the humanly low, an enlivened human 
body (Kass, 2007). This reasoning provides a good argument for permitting 
euthanasia on the basis of dignity as a function of eudaimonia: flourishing cannot 
exist when the human body is no longer able to recover from a terminal illness that 
makes one wholly dependent on the assistance of others for survival. The concept of 
flourishing within an enlivened human body relates well to John Stuart Mill’s 
utilitarian view of dignity. 
 
Utilitarianism 
In Utilitarianism, Mill holds that it is human dignity that generates the ability human 
beings have to experience higher pleasures (Brink, 2014). According to Mill human 
beings are born capable of enjoying higher, as well as lower, pleasures. Dignity, for 
Mill (1824), is demonstrated through the reluctance displayed by a creature with 
advanced abilities to deteriorate into a lower grade of existence: 
We may give what explanation we please of this unwillingness [on the part of 
a competent judge ever to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of 
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existence]…but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity, which 
all human beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no 
means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties…(cited in Brink 2014) 
Higher pleasures, like those derived from love, acquiring knowledge and job 
satisfaction, are longer lasting and more desirable and valuable than lower pleasure 
that provide momentary satisfaction. According to Mill, the higher pleasures often 
contribute to the happiness of others as well as oneself while the lower pleasures are 
often selfish in nature, rarely contributing to the happiness of others. Ultimately for 
Mill, dignity is tied to the happiness that comes from pursuing the higher, mental 
pleasures that are often permanent and contribute to the happiness of oneself and 
others. Green criticises Mill’s doctrine of higher pleasures for being anti-hedonistic 
because its focus is not on creating pleasure but on the dignity it produces (Brink, 
2014). Dignity as a pursuit of higher pleasures can be differentiated from an African 
theory of dignity that simply requires existence and vitality. 
 
Vitality  
This theory is relevant in both Western and African perspectives but it is in the sub-
Saharan regions where dignity is closely related to one’s level of vitality. Vitality is 
traditionally interpreted as a valuable, spiritual or invisible energy that exists in 
physical or visible things and manifests as (but is not limited to) health, strength, 
growth, reproduction, creativity, vibrancy, activity, self-motion, courage and 
confidence. The presence of disease and weakness represents a lack of vitality. This 
life force is an invisible, God given energy that human beings possess more than 
anything else in nature. A vitalist conception of dignity holds that human beings are 
considered supreme because we possess the most life force. This implies that 
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conditions that impact on one’s liveliness, diminishes one’s dignity (Iroegbu, 2005 
cited in Metz 2012:24; Mkhize, 2008 cited in Metz 2012:24). For these reasons, this 
theory appears to support permitting euthanasia based on appeals to dignity as a result 
of vitality. Another African notion of dignity however, dignity as spirituality, appears 
to offer a clear argument for opponents of euthanasia. 
 
Spiritual nature  
Another African notion of dignity can be found in the works of Ramose. His writings 
suggest that human beings have dignity in virtue of them having a soul, a spiritual 
nature that has its source in God. This spiritual nature however, also referred to as a 
divine spark, endows dignity on human beings because it is believed to last beyond 
death (Ramose, 1999 cited in Metz 2011: 543). Robert Kraynak (2008) reiterated this 
idea in his contribution to Human Dignity and Bioethics. For Kraynak, a belief in the 
human soul is required for the special moral status referred to as human dignity. 
According to him, the most feasible argument for human dignity is the one made in 
the Bible, perpetuated by Christian theologians. In this argument, human dignity is an 
enigma and man’s special status rests on the mysterious designation of man as the 
only creature in the universe made in the image of God. This broadens the meaning of 
humanity and extends the concept of the soul beyond rational consciousness to 
include the mysterious divine image. He cites reason as a secondary feature of 
humanity that is required for dignity. Ultimately, for Kraynak, rationality is necessary 
for human dignity but is secondary to the Imago Dei. Opponents of euthanasia could 
argue here that bringing about a person’s death obliterates her soul. Here proponents 
of euthanasia who appeal to dignity as spirituality could argue that the soul survives 
beyond death and as Kraynak pointed out, reason and therefore autonomy are also 
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central to dignity. The aforementioned capacities depend largely on oneself and can 
be differentiated from the following two conceptions that rely on others for dignity to 
by fully realised. A third African conception of dignity can be found in the notion of 
ubuntu (Metz, 2011). 
 
Community  
Ubuntu, according to Desmond Tutu (1999), cannot easily be translated into a 
Western language (cited in Murithi, 2007: 281). It is a concept that can be found in 
varied forms in many societies throughout Africa. The notion of ubuntu emphasises 
the idea that one’s humanity is inextricably linked to the humanity of one’s 
community and that this link enhances one’s capability to transform within that 
community. This notion is prevalent in the Bantu languages of eastern, central, and 
southern Africa. It has also been referred to as humaneness, and a Southern African 
concept of well-being (Cornell, 2005 cited in Van Norren, 2014: 256). Ubuntu can be 
understood by an examination of the moral beliefs and practices of the Nguni 
speaking people in pre-colonial Southern Africa (Metz, 2011). South African 
philosopher, Augustine Shutte (2001), summarised the ethic in his book on ubuntu:  
Our deepest moral obligation is to become more fully human. And this means 
entering more and more deeply into community with others. So although the 
goal is personal fulﬁlment, selﬁshness is excluded. (cited in Metz, 2011: 537) 
There are various interpretations of ubuntu. Thaddeus Metz offers an appealing 
version that best links with the concept of human dignity. His view is that it is one’s 
inherent capacity to commune with others that contributes to one’s humanness and 
ultimately confers dignity, and not the degree to which one exercises this ability. Metz 
advances that ubuntu promotes moral reasoning that is not auto-centric (cited in Van 
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Norren, 2014: 258). Both proponents and opponents of euthanasia can use appeals to 
dignity as a function of ubuntu to support their claims. Permitting either the killing or 
suffering of another human being can both be considered contrary to the tenets of 
ubuntu. According to this ethic, dignity is attained through a person’s ability to use 
her intelligence to show concern for others and to form meaningful relationships with 
other human beings. Dignity here is derived from a communitarian life. Martha 
Nussbaum’s capabilities theory extends the responsibility for individual dignity 
beyond the community, to all democratic governments. 
 
Capabilities 
Martha Nussbaum’s conception of dignity is grounded in capability. For Nussbaum, 
human beings possess inalienable dignity because they are complex, sentient beings 
capable of engaging in a range of activities, including, but not limited to, rationality 
and thriving. Capabilities, or opportunities to function, depend on the world for their 
full development and for their conversion into actual functioning. Amartya Sen 
(1993) has described functioning as the states and activities of a person that constitute 
that person’s being (cited in Claassen, 2014: 240). Capabilities are derived from 
functionings and can be summarised as the freedom to achieve valuable functionings 
(Nussbaum, 2000 cited in Claassen, 2014: 241). Nussbaum uses the term basic 
capabilities to designate the untrained capacities, the term internal capabilities to 
refer to the trained capacities, and the term combined capabilities for the combination 
of trained capacities with suitable circumstances for their exercise. She is critical of 
the Stoic/Kantian assertion that dignity is solely grounded in the basic capability of 
reason. Nussbaum argues that all democracies must ensure a threshold of the 
following core capabilities so that people can pursue dignified lives: Life; Bodily 
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Health; Bodily Integrity; Senses, Imagination, and Thought; Emotions; Practical 
Reason; Affiliation; Other Species; Play; Control over one’s Environment 
(Nussbaum, 2011). She contends that the capabilities require evaluation, and not all 
capabilities in existence are suitable sources of moral claims. She has argued, in her 
political conception of justice, that all citizens are entitled to a threshold level of ten 
core capabilities to lead a life worthy of human dignity. According to Nussbaum, 
there are several discrete variations of dignity, some of which are specific to humans 
and others that belong to non-human species. For humans, there is dignity in human 
need itself and in the distinct forms of striving that emerge from human need. In 
summary, for Nussbaum, there is dignity in the possession of the capabilities that 
contribute to development and functioning, violation of those capabilities constitutes a 
violation of human dignity. 
 
The conceptions outlined in above have been criticised by authors in the following 
section because of the implication that those who lack certain capacities also lack 
dignity. Although Aristotle and Nussbaum argue that the mere possession of these 
very capacities is sufficient for dignity. Mere possession of a capacity like the concept 
of dignity in virtue of one’s nature or mere existence adds more weight to the 
argument made in the next section by the likes of Ruth Macklin who claims that 
dignity is a vague and useless notion. 
 
2.2.3 Dignity: A Useless Concept 
Various bioethicists argue that dignity has no place in bioethics at all and that it is a 
useless concept (Macklin, 2003; Cochrane, 2010). According to Alisdair Cochrane 
(2010) there are three reasons for this claim. Firstly, some thinkers accuse dignity of 
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being a vague concept that is often used in opposing senses. Helga Kuhse (2000) has 
argued that dignity is a slippery notion that should be removed from bioethical 
discussions. She claims that it indiscriminately imposes moral boundaries (cited in 
Van der Graaf & Van Delden, 2009: 152). Secondly, others like Pinker (2008) accuse 
dignity of being a reactionary impediment to medical progress (cited in Cochrane, 
2010: 1). In The Stupidity of Dignity, he describes dignity as a biased concept, unable 
to bear the weight of importance ascribed to it (Pinker, 2008 cited in Palk, 2015: 45). 
Thirdly, dignity has been claimed to be a redundant notion that echoes ideas that can 
be found in other ethical principles (Macklin, 2003). Ruth Macklin and Peter Singer 
claim that human dignity is an unnecessary concept that has been put forth by 
religious thinkers who are opposed to moral autonomy (Guyette, 2013). 
 
Macklin (2003) has declared dignity a useless notion in the ethical analyses of 
medical activities. In her view, calls for dignity are nebulous restatements of other 
more distinct concepts. She claims that dignity is an incoherent concept that when 
invoked in a bioethical debate, is simply an appeal for respect for autonomy. Macklin 
holds that this is particularly apparent in statutes that refer to end-of-life concerns. 
Like the first act recognising advanced directives in the United States, the California 
Natural Death Act 1976: 
In recognition of the dignity and privacy which patients have a right to expect, 
the Legislature hereby declares that the laws of the State of California shall 
recognize the right of an adult person to make a written directive instructing 
his physician to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures in the event 
of a terminal condition. (State of California, 1976) 
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A sentiment reiterated in the first act legalising assisted suicide in the United States, 
the Oregon Death with Dignity Act: 
An adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been determined by 
the attending physician and consulting physician to be suffering from a 
terminal disease, and who has voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die, 
may make a written request for medication for the purpose of ending his or her 
life in a humane and dignified manner. (Oregon revised statutes, 1994) 
For her it is again evident in the first report of the US President’s Council on 
Bioethics entitled Human Cloning and Human Dignity. The report mentions that a 
sense of responsibility is a fundamental component of the notion of human dignity 
and that persons are worthy of respect because they are capable of actions and 
thoughts (President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1983 cited in Macklin, 2003: 1420). 
 
Dignity, for Macklin, repeatedly appears to be nothing other than the biomedical 
principle of respect for autonomy. In her view, what follows from this is the need to 
obtain voluntary, informed consent; the requirement to protect confidentiality; and the 
need to avoid discrimination and abusive practices. Harris (1998) echoes this 
sentiment by claiming that while appeals to dignity are tempting, dignity remains 
vague (cited in Palk, 2015: 45). Singer, who has developed Macklin’s views on 
dignity, believes that those who have exhausted all other arguments in bioethical 
debates eventually appeal to dignity. In Singer’s view, intrinsic dignity usually refers 
to capacities that are not possessed by all humans. Dignity for Singer (1989) does not 
bestow moral consideration. For him the fundamental characteristic that gives cause 
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for equal consideration lies in the capacity for suffering as explained by Jeremy 
Bentham in 1789 (cited in Singer, 1989: 4).  
 
Cochrane (2010) has reiterated Kuhse’s views in his calls for a bioethics without 
dignity. In his paper, Undignified Bioethics, he classifies dignity into four distinct 
conceptions, which he subsequently rejects: dignity as virtuous behaviour, dignity as 
inherent moral worth, Kantian dignity, and dignity as species integrity. For him 
dignity as virtuous behaviour should be rejected because it is either insignificant or 
overly arduous. In his view, this concept is too demanding. Dignified conduct that has 
been equated to exhibiting self-control during hardship is for Cochrane 
supererogatory behaviour that can be too demanding when faced with challenging 
situations. For Cochrane, dignity as the inherent moral worth of all human beings 
should be rejected because it is indiscriminate and tells us nothing. On his view, the 
sentiment that human beings alone possess inherent moral worth as a function of their 
dignity is illogical and unhelpful. In his view, Kantian dignity should be rejected 
because it restricts dignity to those with the capacities for personhood. Similarly 
Cochrane argues that dignity, as species integrity should be rejected because it is 
exclusionary. For him it incorrectly and exclusively links the idea of a flourishing life 
with the possession of normal species functionings that are not possessed by all 
human beings (Cochrane, 2010). According to Warren (1997), debates concerning the 
possession of moral worth are best conducted by appealing to the notion of moral 
status (cited in Cochrane, 2010: 4). 
 
In my view, dignity cannot be reduced to a single definition or tied to a single 
concept. It appears to draw from the network of themes outlined above. In Human 
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Dignity in Bioethics and Law, Charles Foster (2011) criticises all the naysayers and 
declares dignity the “theory of everything”. He rejects Macklin’s claims arguing that 
the concept of dignity grounds respect for autonomy. For him, autonomy would not 
exist without dignity. As for the ambiguous usage of the concept, Foster cites Sonja 
Grover’s comparison of dignity with the concept of justice. According to Foster, in 
the same way justice is not refuted when two separate courts reach differing 
conclusions when presented with the same case, so must dignity not be renounced 
when used in two opposing arguments (Grover 2009, cited in Foster, 2011: 61). The 
next section presents an overview of references to dignity in South African Law, used 
at times by opposing counsel arguing the same case. 
 
2.3. Dignity and South African Law 
Intrinsic dignity is a notion that is entrenched in the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights and has been affirmed in other international human rights instruments and 
national constitutions, including that of South Africa (UN General Assembly, 1948). 
For many, dignity is the basis of all human rights and should be used as a guide to 
their interpretation (Weinrib, 2002). According to Jeremy Waldron, an American 
philosopher of law, the concept of human dignity is solely a legal construct. Like 
Jeremy Bentham, Waldron (2009) holds that “human dignity as an intrinsic worth” 
does not exist (cited in Malvestiti, 2012: 191). For Waldron human dignity exists as a 
status that is assigned equally to every person. In his view, human dignity as a status 
allows for the concept to ground human rights and allows for rights to be demanded. 
 
Inherent dignity however, is a right recognised in the South African Bill of Rights. 
Dignity, along with equality and freedom are the three values on which the Republic 
 31 
of South Africa was founded (Constitution, 1996). According to law professor 
Nazeem Goolam (2000), of these values, the three most fundamental values in any 
open and democratic society, dignity takes precedence. Section 10 states that 
“everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and 
protected” (Constitution, 1996). In my view, this statement speaks to both types of 
dignity: the inherent, inalienable dignity as a worth accorded equally to all human 
beings, and dignity as a violable status as described by Waldron. Anton Fagan (2014) 
describes the role of dignity conferred by the South African Constitution as two-fold: 
dignity as a value that must be promoted, and dignity as a consideration for 
determining whether a competing value can be justifiably limited. 
 
The Constitutional Court of South Africa has highlighted the importance of the value 
of human dignity on numerous occasions. Dignity has been invoked by the 
Constitutional Court when interpreting the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman 
and degrading punishment (S v Makwanyane and another, 1995); the right to freedom 
and security of the person (Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others, 1996); the 
right against unfair discrimination (Harksen v Lane NO and Others, 1997; National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others, 
1998; Prinsloo v Van der Linde and Another, 1997; President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Another v Hugo, 1997); the right to have adequate housing (Government of 
the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others, 2000; Occupiers of 
51 Olivia Road Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg and Others, 2008); the right to privacy (Investigating Directorate: 
Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and 
Others In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and 
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Others, 2000); the right to access social security (Khosa and Others v Minister of 
Social Development and Others Mahlaule and Another v Minister of Social 
Development, 2000); the right to culture (MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal and 
Others v Pillay, 2000); and the right to fair trial (Bothma v Els and Others, 2010). The 
value of human dignity has been used to justifiably limit the right of freedom to 
religion and the right to freedom of expression (Christian Education South Africa v 
Minister of Education, 2000; De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions, 2003; 
Khumalo and Others v Holomisa, 2002).  
 
According to Henk Botha (2009), the “dignity-based jurisprudence” of South Africa’s 
Constitutional Court has highlighted the relationship dignity has to the other 
Constitutional values and the ability it has to influence Constitutional decision-
making. In the death penalty judgement S v Makwanyane and another, Judge 
O’Regan highlighted the interconnectedness of the right to life and the right to 
dignity:  
It is not life as mere organic matter that the Constitution cherishes, but the 
right to human life: the right to live as a human being, to be part of a broader 
community, to share in the experience of humanity. This concept of human 
life is at the centre of our constitutional values. [326] 
The right to life, thus understood, incorporates the right to dignity. So the rights to 
human dignity and life are entwined. The right to life is more than existence, it is 
a right to be treated as a human being with dignity: without dignity, human life is 
substantially diminished. [327] (S v Makwanyane and another, 1995, para. 326 
& 327) 
For Botha (2009) this implies that respect for human dignity also requires the creation 
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of a space within which individuals have the freedom to forge their own autonomous 
identities. Therefore, according to Botha when a law excessively prohibits the 
capacity of an individual to realise her own ends, an amendment to the law would be 
required. On his view a violation of dignity occurs when the restrictive measure 
objectifies or degrades the human person and inhibits the capacity of the individual to 
forge an autonomous identity. This view can be linked with that of the philosopher 
Immanuel Kant (1789), who stated that dignity exists in virtue of autonomy. Judge 
Langa in MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal and Others v Pillay, a judgement 
concerning whether learners should be permitted to wear religious or cultural symbols 
to school, further perpetuated this idea when he expressed the following:  
A necessary element of freedom and of dignity of any individual is an 
‘entitlement to respect for the unique set of ends that the individual pursues’. 
(Woolman, 2006 cited in MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal and Others v 
Pillay, 2000, para. 63) 
 
According to Stuart Woolman, the Constitutional Court’s dignity jurisprudence is 
derived from five definitions of dignity closely related to Kant’s ideas: the 
presumption to always be treated as an end, the entitlement of equal concern and 
respect, the opportunity to fully realise one’s potential, the right to self-govern and 
partake in shared decision-making processes, and shared responsibility to foster 
individual agency (Woolman, 2009 cited in Botha, 2009: 207). Kant’s auto-centric 
philosophy has not been the only theory that has been relied on in South African Case 
Law. The South African courts have acknowledged the significance of family, 
religion, and culture to the identity and dignity of the person ( Christian Education 
South Africa v Minister of Education, 2000; Dawood, Shalabi, Thomas and Another v 
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Minister of Home Affairs and Others, 2000; Minister of Home Affairs and Another v 
Fourie and Another, 2005). In the previous section entitled Theories of Dignity in 
History, Philosophy, and Ethics, Thaddeus Metz (2007) shows that the goal of ubuntu 
is not simply a consideration of what is good for the individual, but the harmony that 
results from other-regarding acts (cited in Van Norren, 2014: 258). In the decision of 
S v Makwanyane and another (1995), Judge Mokgoro described the spirit of ubuntu 
and how it emphasises respect for human dignity.  
 
According to Nazeem Goolam (2000), South Africa, should not only rely on Western 
or European jurisprudence in attempting to understand the notion of human dignity. In 
his view, Judge Arthur Chaskalson summarised the essence of human dignity in 
contemporary South Africa when he expressed that dignity as a value not only 
informs other rights but also plays an essential role when balancing of competing 
rights is required. According to Chaskalson, respect for human dignity grounds the 
social and economic rights embedded in the Constitution. For him however, because 
South African society is undergoing constant transformation, the demands placed by 
the concept of human dignity will develop over time. Dignity he says will play a 
crucial role in establishing the South African society of tomorrow (Chaskalson, 2000 
cited in Goolam, 2000: 10). In the past dignity was used to argue for the right to life 
in a death penalty judgement and just recently dignity was invoked in an argument for 
the right to die in a trial concerning the criminality of euthanasia (S v Makwanyane 
and another, 1995; Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice And Correctional Services 
and Others, 2015). In the future, it is possible that dignity might be used to support 
the decriminalisation of voluntary acts of euthanasia. 
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A number of legal rules have been declared invalid because of an inconsistency with 
the right to dignity in South Africa. These include provisions permitting the death 
penalty (S v Makwanyane and another, 1995); allowing for corporal punishment of 
juvenile offenders (S v Williams and Others, 1995); dealing with applications by 
foreign spouses of South African citizens for immigration and work permits 
(Dawood, Shalabi, Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others, 
2000); regulating intestate succession in the case of black South Africans (Bhe and 
Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate, 2005); criminalising sodomy (National Coalition 
for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others, 1998) 
and decriminalising consensual sexual activity between children aged 12 to 16 (Teddy 
Bear Clinic for Abused Children and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and Another, 2013).  
 
In Soobramoney v Minister of Health KwaZulu-Natal (1998), a 
judgement  concerning the universal constitutional right to medical treatment in an 
under-resourced health care system, Judge Sachs refers to the words of Justice 
Brennan of the US Supreme Court at para.56:  
Nearly every death involves a decision whether to undertake some medical 
procedure that could prolong the process of dying. Such decisions are difficult 
and personal. They must be made on the basis of individual values, informed 
by medical realities, yet within a framework governed by law. (Soobramoney 
v Minister of Health KwaZulu-Natal, 1998, para. 56) 
Ultimately, the applicant’s request to continue renal dialysis at a state hospital was 
denied due to a shortage of resources and the applicant’s chronic medical conditions. 
The Applicant’s Counsel in Stransham-Ford’s case (2015) referred to Soobramoney v 
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Minister of Health KwaZulu-Natal (1998), remarking on the irony in the state 
sanctioning death when it is not the person’s wish or choice to die, but denying a 
dying person the choice of a good death by euthanasia. In their application, they argue 
for the fundamental human right to be able to die with dignity on the basis of the 
following sections of the Constitution: s1 (a) Human dignity, the achievement of 
equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms; s7 (2) The state must 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights); and s8 (3) (a) in 
order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the 
common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right 
(Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice And Correctional Services and Others, 2015, 
para. 14). Counsel for the HPCSA, a respondent in the case, denied that the Applicant 
was suffering from a condition that may have impacted on his dignity. In their view a 
death by euthanasia did not constitute a violation of his human right to dignity 
(Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice And Correctional Services and Others, 2015, 
para. 21). These statements speak to both the extrinsic and intrinsic nature of dignity, 
discussed at length in the next section of this Chapter. 
 
The quotation at the beginning of this report, taken from the more recent Teddy Bear 
Clinic for Abused Children and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and Another judgement (2013), is one of many where the Constitutional 
Court expresses both the intrinsic and extrinsic qualities of dignity: 
Dignity recognises the inherent worth of all individuals (including children) as 
members of our society, as well as the value of the choices that they make. It 
comprises the deeply personal understanding we have of ourselves, our worth 
as individuals, and our worth in our material and social context. (Teddy Bear 
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Clinic for Abused Children and Another v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development and Another, 2013, para. 52)  
In the case of Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice And Correctional Services and 
Others (2015), the applicant sought to end his life with what he referred to as dignity 
through active voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide. For the applicant, this would 
involve a situation where he could breathe unassisted and interact with his loved ones 
in a way that was meaningful to him. The counsel for the applicant in this case 
proposed that by permitting active voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide for a 
terminally ill person who chooses this option, it further respects, protects, promotes, 
advances and fulfils his subjective sense of dignity and personal integrity, and 
therefore his constitutional right to dignity.  
 
At the time of Stransham-Ford’s successful application to be assisted with his suicide, 
Judge Fabricius considered the judgment using Ackermann’s conception of human 
dignity as being not only a value and a right, but also a categorical imperative 
(Ackermann, 2012 cited in Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice And Correctional 
Services and Others, 2015, para. 12). Judge Fabricius found that for many people 
there is no dignity in: 
Having severe pain all over one’s body; being dulled with opioid medication; 
being unaware of your surroundings and loved ones; being confused and 
dissociative; being unable to care for one’s own hygiene; dying in a hospital or 
hospice away from the familiarity of one’s own home; dying, at any moment, 
in a dissociative state unaware of one’s loved ones being there to say good 
bye. (Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice And Correctional Services and 
Others, 2015, para. 15) 
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According to statements made by his counsel, Advocate Stransham-Ford appeared to 
meet the criteria of a terminal illness as outlined in the proposed End of Life Decisions 
Act. This proposed Act defines a terminal illness as an illness; injury or other physical 
or mental condition that: 
a) in reasonable medical judgement, will inevitably cause the untimely death 
of the patient concerned and which is causing the patient extreme 
suffering; or 
b) causes a persistent and irreversible vegetative condition with the result that 
no meaningful existence is possible for the patient. (South African Law 
Commission, 1997: xv) 
These are the same circumstances under which euthanasia can be applied for under 
the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act in the Netherlands. An 
Act that according to the Dutch Due Care Criteria, endorses the right to dignity 
(Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). This Act provides the terminally ill, 
those who are experiencing unendurable suffering with no possibility of 
improvement, with the choice of a dignified death. 
Dignity in South African law appears to be an ever-enduring right that is used to enact 
other, more specific rights and inform the law when no specific right is available 
(Woolman, 2005 cited in Botha, 2009: 198). For South African constitutionalist, 
Pierre De Vos, the concept of dignity is linked to protection of the personal autonomy 
of individuals. For him, dignity is not fully respected when personal life choices like 
those pertaining to bodily integrity and medical care are constrained by criminal law. 
These types of laws, according to De Vos (2015), subject individuals to unendurable 
suffering, constitute an infringement of liberty and dignity, and impinge on their 
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security of person. In my view, forcing a distressed, terminally ill, cognitively 
unimpaired adult, to remain alive against her will is contrary to the notion of dignity 
expressed in South African Law. This will be deliberated further in Chapter Three of 
this report. 
 
I have however shown in the section above that the use of dignity in South African 
Law is not linked to only one philosophical theory or one classification. Uses of 
dignity have included dignity as a feature of autonomy and ubuntu as well as 
references to both the intrinsic and extrinsic nature of dignity, discussed further in the 
following section. 
 
2.4. A Classification of Dignity 
In the previous section I have shown how dignity has been invoked in South African 
Case Law. Unconditional dignity inherently applies to human beings but dignity has 
also been described as something that can be violated or lost (Van der Graaf & Van 
Delden, 2009: 158). Dignity is therefore a concept that can be either unconditional or 
conditional. The unconditional form is an intrinsic, inherent, feature possessed by all 
human beings while the conditional form is an extrinsic, attributable characteristic 
that is acquired by persons through actions and interactions. This differentiation has 
also been referred to in South African law. In the case of Stransham-Ford v Minister 
of Justice And Correctional Services and Others (2015), the applicant’s counsel 
referred to the Stransham-Ford’s subjective sense of dignity in an application to end 
his life through active voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide (para. 13). In the  2002  
Constitutional Court judgement of Khumalo and Others v Holomisa, regarding the 
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limitation of the right to freedom of expression, Judge O’Regan refers to the 
constitutional value of human dignity as not only being  
concerned with an individual’s sense of self-worth, but constitutes an 
affirmation of the worth of human beings in our society. It includes the 
intrinsic worth of human beings shared by all people as well as the individual 
reputation of each person built upon his or her own individual achievements. 
The value of human dignity in our Constitution therefore values both the 
personal sense of self-worth as well as the public’s estimation of the worth or 
value of an individual. (Khumalo and Others v Holomisa, 2002, para. 27) 
 
According to Adam Schulman in Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on 
Bioethics a “person’s dignity resides in his or her biologically and socially 
constructed psychosomatic self with an idiographic proper-named identity” (2008: 4). 
He refers to basic levels of dignity, that speak to the inviolate dignity inherent in all 
human beings, and developmental levels of dignity that can be acquired, diminished, 
recognised and denied. I will look at the two types of dignity defined by a number of 
bioethicists and referenced in the aforementioned Constitutional Court judgements to 
examine how these categories impact on my argument. 
 
In Defining Dignity and Its Place in Human Rights, Lucy Michael (2014) classifies 
conceptions of dignity into two categories: full inherent dignity and non-inherent 
dignity, which I have reclassified respectively as intrinsic dignity and extrinsic 
dignity.  
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2.4.1 Intrinsic Dignity 
For Michael, intrinsic dignity is the category that forms the foundation of human 
rights and by implication, the right to equal moral consideration by others. It is an 
absolute, permanent, inviolate quality possessed equally by all human beings and is a 
hugely significant concept that informs decisions in legal and ethical discourse. 
Intrinsic dignity, often used interchangeably with the concept of inherent value, is 
indivisible: an entity either has it or it does not. It cannot be possessed in part or in 
degrees and by the same token, it cannot be damaged or removed. Here Michael 
appeals to the theory of natural kinds whereby all human beings, regardless of their 
capacity to fulfil the traits associated with full moral status, have intrinsic dignity in 
virtue of their membership of a specific species (Sulmasy, 2007 cited in Michael, 
2014: 16).  Intrinsic dignity is not based on extrinsic factors such as social standing or 
skills and is not a value conferred or created by human choices but is prior to human 
attribution (Sulmasy 2008). Intrinsic dignity is not dependent on God, the state, or the 
influence of others. For Michael, regardless of whether dignity as a concept grounds 
human rights or whether it is a desired outcome that must be protected by rights, 
civilised societies in which serious abuses of people are prevented cannot exist 
without intrinsic dignity. 
 
Rao’s view (2011) of intrinsic dignity can however be differentiated from Michael’s. 
For Rao, intrinsic dignity is: “primarily a liberal, individualistic conception of dignity 
that depends on human agency or the ability to choose a good life, not any particular 
choice between good lives” (cited in Michael, 2014: 18). Here she presents a concept 
of intrinsic dignity that extends beyond the theory of natural kinds and links the ideas 
of both Kant and Mill in her recognition of intrinsic dignity. In her view, it is not 
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contingent on the manner in which these capacities are exercised. Even when people 
make choices that seem undignified, for Rao, they maintain their intrinsic dignity. For 
her, appeals to intrinsic dignity as a concept support legal claims to individual 
autonomy and protection from state interference. Rao submits that dignity is both 
respected and empowered when an individual pursues her own ends in a manner of 
her choosing. For her, both liberty and autonomy are sources of intrinsic human 
dignity. In my view, Rao’s conception of intrinsic dignity is more suited to the 
category, extrinsic dignity, outlined below.  
 
2.4.2 Extrinsic Dignity 
Extrinsic dignity can be distinguished from intrinsic dignity in that it is defined as a 
condition that is not inherent but one that is acquired, derived from a person’s 
circumstances and behaviour. Extrinsic dignity however cannot exist without the 
presence of intrinsic dignity in the form of a natural, living human being. According 
to Gerwirth (1992), the adjective dignified, which usually refers to a measure of 
serenity or self-control, is used to denote extrinsic dignity (cited in Michael, 2014:19). 
Michael categorises the various conceptions of extrinsic dignity under the following 
headings: 
Attributed/acquired dignity 
This refers to the worth bestowed on one by others either by virtue of their social rank 
or by their moral nature. According to Sulmasy attributed dignity refers to other non-
essential qualities that are attributed to beings that possess intrinsic dignity (Sulmasy, 
2002). Attributed dignity can be lost or damaged depending on one’s circumstances or 
behaviour. Sulmasy (2012) describes this type of extrinsic dignity as dimensional, as 
some people can have more attributed dignity than others (cited in Michael, 2014:21). 
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He further expresses that this type of dignity is created and involves a choice 
(Sulmasy, 2008). 
Substantive dignity 
Rao (2011) defines substantive dignity in relation to what is valuable for individuals 
and society as a whole (cited in Michael, 2014: 22). For Rao, it is measured by 
personal goals and is defined by subjective cultural conceptions of the good life 
(Dworkin, 2006 cited in Michael, 2014: 22). It is associated with having access to the 
social and economic goods required to maintain a certain minimum standard of living. 
Dignity of identity 
The dignity of identity is the dignity that we attribute to ourselves as integrated and 
autonomous persons (Nordenfelt, 2004 cited in Michael, 2014: 25). It is linked to 
one’s sense of self and self-worth derived from physical characteristics and 
capabilities, sexuality, religion and health. The dignity of identity can be attenuated 
by external factors such as the treatment of others, injury, illness and aging. 
Relational dignity 
Relational dignity refers to the dignity derived from relationships. Cooperative 
relationships are essential to human social existence and constitute human expression 
(Malpas, 2007 cited in Michael, 2014: 26). 
 
The distinction between intrinsic dignity and extrinsic dignity is not often made in 
legal or ethical discourse resulting in the terms being used interchangeably. Both 
categories are however important when applying conceptions of dignity in these 
areas. According to Michael and Sulmasy, intrinsic dignity is logically prior to 
extrinsic dignity and therefore forms the foundation of our understanding of dignity. 
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Michael holds that these categories cannot be completely separated in the way 
Sulmasy suggests because of overlapping conceptions. For her this is evident with 
relational dignity: in recognising another person’s intrinsic dignity, we express our 
own intrinsic dignity, which allows us to be dignified in our behaviour in the non-
inherent, extrinsic sense. This causes others to attribute extrinsic dignity to us 
(Michael, 2014). 
 
In their integrative review of various empirical studies surrounding dignity in end-of-
life care, Guo and Jacelon (2014) show that it is linked to both intrinsic dignity and 
extrinsic dignity. They conclude that extrinsic dignity forms the basis of appeals to 
dignity at the end of life. Both Mairis and Johnson describe dignity in end-of-life care 
in terms of attributed dignity, substantive dignity, dignity of identity and relational 
dignity. Dignity, for Mairis (1994), is a personal possession connected to cognitive 
abilities, feeling comfortable with oneself, having control over one’s behaviours and 
feeling valuable in relation to others and be treated as such by others (cited in Guo & 
Jacelon, 2014: 932). For Johnson (1990), dignity reflects one’s choices, values, 
behaviour, and lifestyle (cited in Guo & Jacelon, 2014: 932). Various models have 
been developed to assess care and produce dignity-related interventions in end-of-life 
care. Pleschberger’s Dignity Conceptual Model differentiates dignity into personal 
dignity and relational dignity (Pleschberger, 2007 cited in Guo & Jacelon, 2014: 936-
938). Personal dignity is linked to the extrinsic dignity categories of substantive 
dignity and dignity of identity. Relational dignity, a category of extrinsic dignity, is 
the dignity derived from one’s social relationships and encounters. The Dignity 
Model, developed by Canadian scholars Chochinov and colleagues (2002) is based on 
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patient data and highlights the three primary resources that affect patients’ sense of 
dignity: 
Illness-related concerns   
This is linked to the physical and psychological symptoms that arising from the 
illness. 
Dignity-conserving repertoire  
These are the internal resources that patients bring to the illness related to their past 
experiences, psychological states, and their spiritual life. 
Social dignity inventory   
This includes factors within the social environment that affect patients’ sense of 
dignity. (Chochinov et al., 2002 cited in Guo & Jacelon, 2014: 936). 
 
In Sulmasy’s view (2002), debilitating illness can influence the various categories of 
extrinsic dignity because it inflicts attributed indignities upon those who are suffering. 
For him, appeals to dignity from those in favour of euthanasia call for eliminating 
non-inherent indignities and to preserve the extrinsic dignity, which is grounded in 
intrinsic dignity. He holds that intrinsic dignity is the category of dignity being 
referred to in appeal to dignity arguments against euthanasia. According to Sulmasy, 
euthanasia described as an attempt to uphold extrinsic dignity undermines intrinsic 
dignity. This forms the basis of his argument against euthanasia. 
 
Dignity has been invoked in countless debates around voluntary euthanasia and 
assisted suicide. In 1997 the United States Supreme Court heard two cases in which 
the constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide was debated (Vacco v Quill, 1997 
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cited in Gentzler, 2003: 461 & Washington v Glucksberg, 1997 cited in Gentzler, 
2003: 461). Applicants sought to end the remainder of their lives with the dignity that 
they believed they would be deprived of if strong analgesics were administered to 
them, as these would affect their awareness, dependency, and vulnerability as death 
approached. Dignity on this view, is extrinsic, and a property that can be diminished 
due to the loss of cognition, consciousness, and independence associated with 
terminal illness. By the same token, for these applicants dignity would be upheld 
through assisted suicide. I submit that intrinsic dignity is recognising the inherent 
worth possessed by beings in virtue of their nature. Extrinsic dignity is an extension 
of intrinsic dignity that recognises the capacities outlined in an earlier section entitled 
Theories of Dignity in History, Philosophy, and Ethics. These capacities are exercised 
in varying degrees, which include our own conception of what it means to have a 
good life and to flourish. 
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CHAPTER 3: APPEALS TO DIGNITY IN THE EUTHANASIA 
DEBATE 
 
 
This chapter reviews the themes and legal references outlined in Chapter Two, and 
includes a discussion on how these apply to the euthanasia debate that is centred on 
dignity. The problem with trying to define dignity is perhaps trying to link it to just 
one concept. In Bioethics: An African Perspective, Godfrey Tangwa (1996) criticises 
the West’s preoccupation with theorising. He uses the Nso’ position condemning 
Western philosophy for insisting that all bioethical issues can be understood from one 
principle. In his view the Nso’ people, from the Bamenda Highlands in Cameroon, 
would probably endorse euthanasia for someone, who has lived a full life, and 
anticipates a good death with gracefulness. According to Tangwa, the Nso’ fear 
illness and suffering but not death. Their approach stems from what Tangwa refers to 
as Nso’ eco-bio-communitarianism: a human-centered approach to morality that is 
linked to well-being. According to Cynthia Cohen (2007), dignity is an all-
encompassing concept that refers to a network of ideas and like the intangible notions 
of equality and liberty; it should be treated as an important moral concept (cited in 
Michael, 2014: 30). In my view, based on the overview of the various themes credited 
with grounding dignity in section 2.2, all but one can be linked to intrinsic dignity. 
Human dignity as a function of nature appears to offer the only reasonable connection 
thus far to the concept of intrinsic dignity. The rest of the themes are grounded in 
capacities and can therefore be better linked to extrinsic dignity. The capacity for 
reason, autonomy, freedom, virtue, thriving, vitality, community, integrity, 
spirituality, higher pleasures, and/or capabilities are not intrinsic to all human beings. 
Since these are possessed and exercised in different degrees by various human beings 
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and sometimes not at all, I would classify these capacities as belonging to the 
category of extrinsic dignity.  
 
Omojenzele (2004) and Masaka (2010) defend euthanasia using a vitalist conception 
of dignity, which according to Ferdinand Sakali, does not correlate with his 
understanding of the notion within African ethics (cited in Sakali, 2013: 10). For 
Omojenzele and Masaka, reduced vitality in the form of a terminal illness that 
diminishes strength, growth, reproduction, creativity, vibrancy, activity, self-motion, 
courage and confidence makes for an undignified existence. These features are tied to 
one’s own conception of extrinsic dignity and certainly explain why a reduction in 
vitality can be viewed as a loss of dignity. Sakali cites a passage from Bantu 
Philosophy by Placide Temples (1969), a Belgian missionary who spent many years 
in the Congo, to explain why he believes euthanasia conflicts with the African vitalist 
idea of dignity:  
Every act, every detail of behavior, every attitude and every human custom, 
which militates against the vital force or against the hierarchy of the “muntu”, 
is bad. The destruction of life is a conspiracy against the Divine plan; and the 
“muntu” knows that such destruction is, above all else, ontological sacrilege: 
that it is for that reason immoral and therefore unjust. (cited in Sakali, 2013: 
10) 
According to Sakali (2013), in African ethics, a human being represents a vital force 
and intentional killing of that being is unethical since it destroys the vital force 
resulting in disharmony in the hierarchy of beings. 
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In Kant’s view, all human beings have dignity in virtue of their capacity for 
autonomous action. This capacity, according to Kant (1785), is inherent in all human 
beings whether or not it is exercised (cited in Gentzler, 2003: 462). According to 
Velleman (1999), voluntary euthanasia violates one’s own dignity in the Kantian 
sense: “People violate their dignity when they use themselves as a mere means: 
ending one’s life out of self-interest is no rational choice” (cited in Van der Graaf & 
Van Delden, 2009: 159). He further holds that ending one’s life out of self-interest is 
not a rational choice. Velleman argues that dignity, unlike well-being, cannot be 
acquired or weakened since it is a value within one (cited in Van der Graaf & Van 
Delden, 2009: 158). He holds that a person is prohibited from ending her life simply 
because she feels that she is not getting enough out of it. Kant’s understanding of 
human dignity therefore does not appear to support the legalisation of assisted suicide 
(Kant, 1785 cited in Gentzler, 2003: 463). For many liberal political theorists 
however, the opposite is true.  
 
Dworkin is one of many contemporary thinkers who have made the connection 
between autonomy and dignity. He supports the right of a person to make her own 
decisions about deeply personal matters, particularly the choice of how to die, a 
choice he believes is fundamental to personal dignity and autonomy (Dworkin et al., 
1996/1998 cited in Gentzler, 2003: 470). Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, 
Thomas Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thomson along with Dworkin hold that a person 
has the right to make her own decisions concerning the manner and timing of her 
death because death is one of the most significant events of human life (Gentzler, 
2003). These theorists advocate that physician-assisted suicide might be reasonably 
restricted to the terminally ill. Even Velleman (1999) admits that it is possible to 
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reach a stage where living with dignity is no longer possible, a point where he thinks 
that euthanasia and suicide are morally permissible (cited in Van der Graaf & Van 
Delden, 2009: 159). For Dworkin (2006), dignity is synonymous with personal 
responsibility: an individual has an obligation to express her own personal values and 
realise those values through autonomous choices (cited in Michael, 2014: 18). For 
him, deciding when and how to die correlates with the integrity of a life we have 
chosen for ourselves. Treating a terminally ill person with dignity, on Dworkin’s view 
(1993), involves respecting her right to choose the manner and time of her death. 
Laws prohibiting euthanasia, so that terminally ill people die in a way decided by 
others, are for him repugnant and oppressive (cited in Gentzler, 2003: 472). 
Beauchamp and Childress (2008) have also suggested that depriving an autonomous 
individual who is terminally ill of the option of euthanasia will result in a loss of 
dignity and despair (cited in Clarke & Egan, 2009: 25).  
 
According to Willem Landman (2012) who has been advocating for the right to 
euthanasia in South Africa for a number of years, autonomy, and dignity are 
intertwined. For him, our autonomy may be entrenched in a network of relationships. 
Respect thereof means recognising the right of others to judge their own well-being, 
thereby respecting their human dignity. The South African Law Commission favoured 
the introduction of voluntary active euthanasia in South Africa. In the proposed End 
of Life Decisions Act (1997), the commission recommended that it should be strictly 
regulated and monitored to ensure the autonomy of competent terminally ill patients, 
while guarding against any possible abuse of the system. Respect for autonomy 
however does not completely justify the “right to die with dignity”. Jyl Gentzler 
(2003) explains this well when she points out that not all acts that are self-determined 
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necessarily enhance dignity. So for her an appeal to dignity that rests solely on the 
ability to control, does not by itself justify the legalisation of euthanasia.  
 
John Stuart Mill’s harm principle holds that an individual should be guaranteed 
freedom from interference with her self-regarding action as long as this action does 
not adversely affect anyone else (Brink, 2014). At the time of Stransham-Ford’s 
successful application to be assisted with his suicide, Judge Fabricius considered the 
judgment using Ackerman’s conception of human dignity: it being not only a value 
and a right, but also a categorical imperative (Ackermann, 2012 cited in Stransham-
Ford v Minister of Justice And Correctional Services and Others 2015, para. 12).  
Counsel for the Applicant remarked on the irony that exists in a society where 
individuals are instructed from a young age to be accountable for all aspects of their 
lives and actions yet at the end-of-life, they are told that they cannot extend that 
accountability to the manner in which they die (Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice 
And Correctional Services and Others, 2015, para. 19). This sentiment resonates with 
the notion of Kantian autonomy and Mill’s concept of liberty.   
 
Opponents of euthanasia and assisted suicide hold that the endurance of suffering 
confers its own dignity. Intentionally ending a human life for them is wrong, because 
life is sacred and the deliberate killing of another person violates her intrinsic dignity. 
Intrinsic dignity is traditionally accepted as a concept that is tied to nature, which may 
or may not have a theological basis, and requires nothing besides mere existence. In 
spite of calls form Hume for a confirmation of dignity that is not rooted in theology, 
intrinsic dignity is steeped in religiosity. This makes intrinsic dignity-based 
approaches somewhat challenging in pluralistic, secular societies. A sentiment echoed 
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by Nussbaum (2008) who holds that human dignity is in itself violated when political 
arrangements are based on a single comprehensive doctrine.  
 
The various groups who oppose euthanasia include religious factions, disability 
groups, the World Medical Association, the South African Medical Association, the 
HPCSA and Hospice Palliative Care Association of South Africa. Hospice Palliative 
Care Association of South Africa (2014) describes palliative care as an approach that 
improves the quality of life of the terminally ill  Their mission statement is “to 
promote quality in life, dignity in death and support in bereavement for all living with 
a life-threatening illness…”. My argument against this view is that involuntary 
palliative care paradoxically conflicts with the notion of human dignity because it 
involves the perpetration of further suffering on those who are already enduring 
unending agony against their will. Atul Gawande (2014), a physician who ha written 
extensively about the doctor-patient relationship, is one of many who fear that 
legalisation of euthanasia will create a dependence on it and will result in an under 
developed palliative care system. Gawande worries that premature death will become 
a cheap alternative to palliative care. However, according to a 2011 EAPC report 
entitled Palliative Care Development in Countries with Euthanasia Law, it was 
shown that palliative care and the practice of euthanasia appear to reinforce each 
other. The EAPC task team found that the two practices were not mutually exclusive 
and both reinforced dignity (Chambaere et al., 2011). They also found that euthanasia 
accounted for only 1.7% of all deaths in the Netherlands and that the practice of 
euthanasia did not hinder the development palliative care. Research has shown that 
patients who choose assisted suicide in Oregon have been well-informed and were 
recipients of palliative care (McElvoy, 2015). Patients reportedly choose assisted 
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suicide because of a desire to preserve their own dignity, autonomy, and pleasure in 
life. This, in my view, shows that both palliative care and euthanasia are practices that 
can enhance extrinsic dignity under certain circumstances. 
 
Dignity is indeed a rich and complex concept that cannot be reduced to just one 
principle. In South African law it has been invoked in both its extrinsic and intrinsic 
forms to resolve conflicts and render judgements that involve competing 
constitutional values. The use of a term as ill-defined as dignity, in various legal 
judgements, has been criticised by many. Henk Botha suggests that it might be 
possible to make sense of the term by completely changing the debate. For Botha, it is 
precisely the ambiguity of dignity that allows for an evaluation of the “possibilities 
and limits of a dignity-based jurisprudence” (2009: 217). For him it not absolute value 
that can simply be used to support other rights but it is something that must be 
evaluated when deliberating over competing rights. In his view, dignity as an inherent 
state is paradoxical because it often is a culturally mediated notion determined by the 
state, dependent on identifying within a community, demands respect for cultural 
value patterns and institutional arrangements while at the same time celebrating the 
notion of the autonomous self, promotes individual freedom while being subject to 
socio-economic conditions, and “demands an impossible and unlimited responsibility 
to respect and protect everyone’s inherent dignity, regardless of national boundaries 
and countervailing rights and interests” (Botha 2009: 219).  Dignity has nevertheless 
informed various judgements. In S v Makwanyane and another (1995), Judge 
O’Regan refers to dignity as an essential component of human life, a requirement for 
a life that amounts to more than simply existing. Other Constitutional Court 
judgements have highlighted the importance, value, and worth of autonomous choices 
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in society. The fact that both forms of dignity have been mentioned in Constitutional 
Court judgements further highlights the importance and weight of both categories of 
dignity. In my view, this means that intrinsic dignity does not necessarily outweigh 
extrinsic dignity, as Sulmasy suggests, and that balancing of the two is required to 
resolve bioethical and legal dilemmas. 
 
The network of philosophical concepts outlined in section 2.1 that have been 
classified as extrinsic dignity requires agency and support for its development. 
Following on from her classification on section 2.3, Lucy Michael explains that 
multiple conceptions of dignity can be expressed at the same time. For her, 
individuals will always have intrinsic dignity but are able to continue to strive for 
extrinsic dignity (Michael, 2014). Therefore dignity is both something we have in the 
form of intrinsic dignity and something we can acquire and lose in the form of 
extrinsic dignity. If the capacities for reason, autonomy, freedom, virtue, thriving, 
vitality, community, integrity, spirituality, and/or capabilities have been devastated by 
disease it is not unreasonable for an individual to consider her life not worthy of 
human dignity. Choosing how to die for opponents of euthanasia takes away the very 
life that makes it inherently valuable in the first place. Sulmasy argues that since 
extrinsic dignity can’t exist without intrinsic dignity, violation of extrinsic dignity 
does not justify the legalisation of euthanasia. Sulmasy and other opponents of 
euthanasia would rather subject the terminally ill, who favour euthanasia and refuse 
further palliative care, to further extrinsic indignities than violate intrinsic dignity. 
Opponents of euthanasia will argue that by the same token, suffering is also a part of 
life and there is dignity in accepting this. Death however is an inevitable part of life 
and one’s death, regardless of how it takes place, does not and cannot render the life 
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that precedes that death worthless. What then is the point of intrinsic dignity if 
extrinsic dignity isn’t advocated? I repeat that extrinsic dignity extends from intrinsic 
dignity but that does not necessarily mean that intrinsic dignity always carries more 
weight in bioethical dilemmas.  
 
In his approach to bioethical dilemmas, Charles Foster (2011) recommends the use of 
his dignity formula where the dignities of all the relevant stakeholders are weighted. 
Stakeholders include the patient, her friends, family, and community of health care 
providers. For a person at the end-of-life, all aspects of extrinsic dignity are impacted 
on: the attributed dignity related to one’s role within one’s broader community, the 
substantive dignity connected to conceptions of the good life defined by one’s 
community, the dignity of identity is derived from one’s autonomy, and the relational 
dignity that extends from one’s relationships. These same categories however, also 
impact on the dignities of the involved stakeholders. In my view, the impasse between 
intrinsic and extrinsic dignity should be resolved by balancing them using a derivative 
of Foster’s dignity formula.  
 
An outline of the findings of Guo and Jocelyn (2014) who reviewed a number of 
empirical studies examining dignity in end-of-life care illustrate the importance of 
extrinsic dignity at the end-of-life. The studies they evaluated showed that dying with 
dignity was not only found to be important by dying patients, but it was significant to 
the families, and health-care providers of dying patients (Chochinov, Hack, Hassard, 
et al., 2002 cited in Guo & Jacelon, 2014: 932; Steinhauser, Christakis, Clipp, et al., 
2000 cited in Guo & Jacelon, 2014: 932). Their sources included theoretical reports 
and qualitative and quantitative empirical reports with a focus on dignity in end-of-
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life care. Findings from these sources showed that dying with dignity; to patients, 
families, and health care professionals in end-of-life care has various meanings. These 
include dignity as: a human right; autonomy and independence; relieved symptom 
distress; respect; being human and being self; meaningful relationships; dignified 
treatment and care; existential/spiritual satisfaction; privacy; and a safe and calm 
environment. These findings contribute to the weight of extrinsic dignity at the end-
of-life and how it impacts on intrinsic dignity. Following their extensive review of 
dignity in end-of-life care, Guo and Jacelon have highlighted the involvement of all 
Foster’s stakeholders and have proposed the following definition of dying with 
dignity: 
Dying with dignity is a basic human right; it is a subjective experience and 
also a value influenced by others; it signifies a dying process with the 
following characteristics: dying with minimal symptom distress and limited 
invasive treatment, being human and being self, maintaining autonomy and 
independence to the greatest extent, achieving existential and spiritual goals, 
having self-respect and being respected by others, having privacy, maintaining 
meaningful relationships with significant others, and receiving dignified care 
in a calm and safe environment. (Guo & Jacelon, 2014: 937)  
Guo and Jocelyn’s review has shown that at the end-of-life, the dignity of the dying 
person as well as that of her family and friends and particularly the dignity of the 
physician who will assist in the suicide are all significant. Dying with dignity in Guo 
and Jocelyn’s review appears to be a dynamic concept that changes as an illness 
progresses. As dying patients move toward death, dignity develops into a concept that 
is dependent on others (Pleschberger, 2007 cited in Guo & Jacelon, 2014: 938; 
Pullman, 2004 cited in Guo & Jacelon, 2014: 938; Street and Kissane, 2001 cited in 
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Guo & Jacelon, 2014: 938). All categories of extrinsic dignity are of importance here 
even if stakeholders hold views that oppose those of the dying person. These, in my 
view, must be weighted to determine the value of both categories of dignity at the 
end-of-life. In their review they found that dying with dignity has different meanings 
for different individuals because extrinsic dignity is innately created and is subject to 
one’s own sense of identity, personal values and standards in regard to one’s cultural 
and social aspects (Anderberg, Lepp, Berglund et al., 2007 cited in Guo & Jacelon, 
2014: 938). These empirical findings are an important contribution to the normative 
evaluation undertaken in this report. 
 
Death with dignity-based approaches often place individual self-determination at the 
centre of human dignity. But death by choice respects both autonomy and dignity that 
is linked to some or all of the concepts related to extrinsic dignity: freedom, virtue, 
thriving, vitality, community, integrity, spirituality, higher pleasures and capabilities, 
and its categories: attributed dignity, substantive dignity, dignity of identity, and 
relational dignity. For many persons facing death this involves choosing the time and 
manner of death. In my view, dignity referred to here is linked to a network of 
theories over and above autonomy. Appeals for a dignified death are linked to both 
autonomy and respect for extrinsic dignity, and whichever capacities extrinsic dignity 
is tied to. A death with dignity is not simply respecting an individual’s choice but it 
involves respect for the extrinsic dignity developed over one’s lifetime. In my view it 
is not simply an appeal to avoid great suffering. In What is a Death with Dignity? Jyl 
Gentzler explains that she would rather rephrase the term a “death with dignity” as a 
“life with dignity until its very end” (2003: 462). This includes wanting to die without 
being a burden on others and more importantly, in a manner that is in keeping with 
 58 
the way that one has lived and in a way that one wants to be remembered. This 
involves dying when life is no longer considered a benefit, but has now become a 
burden. Request for assisted suicide from the terminally ill is a reasonable request 
related not only to autonomy but also to all or many of the categories of extrinsic 
dignity, particularly to those of vitality, thriving and higher pleasure. The difficulty 
with assisted suicide is that it requires action from another person, a physician, whose 
commitment to treat conflicts with the practice of euthanasia. However, in my view 
criminalising voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide remains hypocritical because 
physicians withdraw life-sustaining treatment of patients on a daily basis when they 
deem the treatments as futile. Subjecting anyone to pain and suffering and medical 
interventions against her will hardly seems like an exercise that upholds her dignity. 
This type of medical paternalism is referred to by Pierre de Vos (2015) in Euthanasia: 
An Imperative In A Constitutional Democracy where he refers to the ethical rules on 
assisted dying enforced by the Health Professions Council of South Africa as absurd. 
Demands for the preservation of intrinsic dignity from those who oppose euthanasia 
are not sufficient to warrant criminalising the practice because it wholly under values 
extrinsic dignity. An appeal to maintain extrinsic dignity from those who oppose 
euthanasia imposes a unilateral conception of extrinsic dignity on all members of 
society. Decriminalisation of euthanasia however allows a person to choose or reject 
the practice thereby expressing her own conception of extrinsic dignity. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 
When appeals to a concept like dignity are invoked on opposite sides of the same 
ethical debate, clarification of the concept is required. Dignity is difficult to define; it 
can be linked to a range of concepts, appears to be context -specific, and is oftentimes 
determined by culture. I have carried out a normative assessment of the notion of 
dignity to assess the value, meaning, and impact of dignity on morality and law 
concerning euthanasia in South Africa. I have reinforced my argument with results 
from empirical studies and I have shown that dignity cannot be linked to just one 
concept.  
 
Arguments against euthanasia that speak to the sanctity of life and the wrongness of 
taking a life as well as slippery slope arguments that refer to vulnerability and 
coercion have not been deliberated in this report. Dignity does not provide all the 
answers in this debate. My conclusion is therefore not an all things considered 
argument that permitting euthanasia is ethically and legally mandated, since there 
may be competing values and rights that have not been taken into account.  
 
The desire to uphold human dignity is completely justified since it is rooted in a 
network of concepts that ground personhood. Intrinsic dignity affords persons the 
opportunity to develop extrinsic dignity. Intrinsic dignity however does not appear to 
require any form of agency beyond that of mutual respect. Extrinsic dignity on the 
other hand is far more demanding, it depends on one’s own actions and that of others 
to flourish. According to Sulmasy (2001) it is not possible to respect someone’s 
intrinsic dignity by intentionally bringing about that person’s death. Sulmasy makes 
an argument against euthanasia on the basis of intrinsic dignity alone. He refers to the 
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physical appearance of patients, their degree of independence, their social worth, and 
their ability to make rational choices as attributed dignities, a category of extrinsic 
dignity. In his view, while we have a duty to build up these attributed dignities, 
assisted suicide remains immoral because it undermines the intrinsic dignity that gives 
rise to attributed human dignities in the first place (Sulmasy, 2002). Here he appears 
to ascribe a value to intrinsic dignity that in his view holds more weight than extrinsic 
dignity ever could. He holds that the decimation of attributed dignities cannot 
eliminate one’s intrinsic dignity. I would argue that at the end-of-life, one may reach a 
stage where this decimation affects the way in which we value our own intrinsic 
dignity, from which our extrinsic dignity stems. At the end-of-life, when one is 
suffering interminably, one might reach a point where intrinsic dignity has no value to 
oneself because of a loss extrinsic dignity. At this stage, the irretrievable loss of 
extrinsic dignity could reasonably outweigh the intrinsic dignity valued so absolutely 
by Sulmasy. 
 
I have shown that extrinsic dignity is linked to a range of ideas and consists of a 
number of categories that all contribute to human life in a more meaningful way than 
the mere possession of intrinsic dignity does. Extrinsic dignity is lost when terminally 
ill persons are deprived of the decision of when to die. Dignity in dying may be 
restored when one’s last chosen moment involves interacting with loved ones in a 
lucid, coherent state. In the Kantian sense, this would involve autonomously choosing 
when to die because of one’s own sense of extrinsic dignity. This may be linked to 
African conceptions of dignity derived from vitality and community, one’s own 
conception of the good life and spirituality, and various other capabilities. In the case 
of an interminable illness, extrinsic dignity as an extension of intrinsic dignity 
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therefore supports a moral and legal right to voluntary euthanasia and physician 
assisted suicide. That is, intrinsic dignity should not be understood as having an 
absolute, overriding all things considered value. In certain circumstances, intrinsic 
dignity may be outweighed by extrinsic considerations. I conclude that: persons have 
an extrinsic dignity in virtue of their inherent, intrinsic dignity that can be extended to 
include the moral and legal right to die with dignity. 
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